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Abstract. We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto
games in which N

2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battle…elds. An agent’s

vector of battle…eld valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp -space.
We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent’s resource allocation
to a given battle…eld is strictly monotone in the agent’s valuation of that battle…eld. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any
information rent. We also outline an extension to networks of Blotto games.
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1. Introduction
In a Colonel Blotto game, …nitely many agents (parties in a military con‡ict,
say) simultaneously allocate their limited resources to a given set of battle…elds. The agent that deploys the largest amount of the resource to a given
battle…eld wins in that battle…eld. Moreover, each agent’s payo¤ depends on
the set of battle…elds won. This type of game has been among the …rst games
seriously studied in the literature (Borel, 1921; Borel and Ville, 1938), and has
since found widespread application in military theory, political economy, and
security analysis, for instance (cf. Roberson, 2010).
In this paper, we introduce a new class of N -player Colonel Blotto games
with (N + 1) battle…elds and multidimensional incomplete information regarding battle…eld valuations. We assume that valuation vectors are private
information and independently distributed across agents. Only the joint distribution of valuation vectors is common knowledge. Each agent maximizes
the expected sum of valuations of battle…elds won, where resource budgets
are …xed and homogeneous across agents, and where unused resources do not
create any positive value. In this framework, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent’s resource allocation to a battle…eld is strictly
monotone increasing in her valuation of that battle…eld. The construction of
equilibria for more than two agents relies on a new method. Speci…cally, we exploit the particular properties of uniform distributions on generalized spheres
in …nite-dimensional vector spaces equipped with an Lp -norm. The necessary
mathematical background will be reviewed in Section 2.

1

Past years have seen a rise in interest in Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information. In a model with N

2 agents and private information

about budgets, Adamo and Matros (2009) identi…ed a symmetric monotone
Bayes-Nash equilibrium. A higher budget allows an agent to scale up her
resource allocation, while the share of the resource allocated to individual
battle…elds remains constant. This reduces the analysis to a one-dimensional
problem which is tractable.1 No general results are available, however, when
agents possess private information about battle…eld valuations.2 Kovenock
and Roberson (2011) presented an example with two agents and three battle…elds.3 Private valuations of battle…elds are drawn independently from a
uniform distribution over a two-dimensional surface element that corresponds
to the intersection of the nonnegative orthant with the Euclidean unit sphere.
Since, in this case, marginal distributions are uniform, the budget constraint
may be kept by bidding the squared valuation on each battle…eld. It turns
out that this strategy constitutes a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the
Colonel Blotto game.
Extending this example in a substantial way, Akyol (2014) considered a
setting with two agents and N

2 battle…elds, where agents’valuation vectors

are drawn from absolutely continuous, possibly heterogeneous distributions.4
1

Kim and Kim (2017) considered a similar set-up for the lottery contest.
This lack of general results contrasts with the rich theory on single-unit all-pay auctions
with incomplete information. See Weber (1985), Hillman and Riley (1989), Amann and
Leininger (1995, 1996), and Krishna and Morgan (1997), for example.
3
Kovenock and Roberson (2011) note that their approach easily generalizes to any number of battle…elds N that is an integer multiple of three.
4
In the exceptional case of N = 2 battle…elds, Akyol (2014) even allows for arbitrary
distributions and identi…es a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies.
2

2

He constructed explicit examples using the Generalized Gamma Distribution,
the uniform distribution on a three-dimensional Eucidean ball, and the uniform
distribution on a three-dimensional volume bounded by two Euclidean spheres
of di¤erent radius. The present paper goes beyond Akyol’s (2014) important
contribution by presenting a class of examples of N -agent Colonel Blotto games
with incomplete information about valuations.5
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
the necessary background on uniform spherical distributions. The set-up is
introduced in Section 3. Section 4 contains the equilibrium analysis. The
issue of information rents is discussed in Section 5. An extension to network
games is considered in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.

2. Lp -norm uniform distributions
The results of this section are essentially well-known in the mathematical literature. We will follow the exposition in Song and Gupta (1997).6
For an integer n

3, and a real parameter p > 0, we consider Euclidean

5

There are a number of less closely related papers. Powell (2007) studied a signaling
game with private information about vulnerability. Paarporn et al. (2019) assumed onesided incomplete information in a Colonel Blotto game with a …nite state space. Finally, in
a model of price setting with menu costs for multiproduct …rms, Alvarez and Lippi (2014)
made use of the marginals of a uniform distribution on a higher-dimensional Euclidean
sphere that represents a vector of price changes. They, however, studied the problem of a
monopolist, i.e., there is no Colonel Blotto game.
6
A helpful overview is given in the recent paper by Ahmadi-Javid and Moeini (2019),
even though we caution the reader that their de…nition of the uniform distribution on the
generalized sphere as a conditional probability measure on a set of measure zero might be
subject to the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox. Another recent contribution in this literature is
Richter (2019).

3

n-space equipped with the Lp -norm
1=p

kykp = (jy1 jp + : : : + jyn jp )
The generalized sphere Spn
Spn

1

1

(y 2 Rn ).

(1)

is de…ned as the subset

= f(y1 ; y2 ; : : : ; yn ) 2 Rn : kykp = 1g

(2)

of vectors of Lp -norm one in Rn . Provided that p > 1, which will be assumed
below, the set Spn

1

is a smooth (n

1)-dimensional submanifold embedded in

Rn .7 Figure 1 illustrates this property for the case where n = p = 3.

Figure 1. The generalized sphere Spn 1 .
To construct a uniform distribution on Spn 1 , we de…ne a particular Lp -norm
spherical distribution on Rn and consider its projection to the generalized
sphere. Let
(3)

X = (X1 ; : : : ; Xn ),
where the components Xj are i.i.d. random variables with p.d.f.
fp (x) =

jxjp
p

p1 1=p
exp
2 ( p1 )

7

(x 2 R),

(4)

For p
1, there may be kinks, and the generalized sphere corresponds to a union of
bordered manifolds.

4

with

(:) denoting the Gamma function. Let Uj = Xj = kXkp , where j =
P
1; : : : ; n. Then, nj=1 jUj jp = 1, and the joint distribution of the vector
(5)

U = (U1 ; : : : ; Un )

is known as the Lp -norm uniform distribution. For p = 2, this probability
distribution corresponds to the uniform distribution on the Euclidean unit
sphere. We have the following result.
Lemma 1 (Song and Gupta, 1997). The joint p.d.f. of U = (U1 ; : : : ; Un )
is given by

g(u1 ; : : : ; un 1 ) =

pn
2n 1

(

1

( np )
( p1 )

n

1

n 1
X
j=1

1 < uj < 1; j = 1; 2; : : : ; n

juj jp
1;

! 1pp

n 1
X
j=1

,

(6)

juj jp < 1).

Proof. See Song and Gupta (1997, Theorem 1.1).
Since the spherical distribution is multidimensional, it is of interest to know
if a stochastic representation in terms of simpler distributions exists. In addition to the de…nition in terms of a collection of independent one-dimensional
exponential distributions, stochastic representations may be derived from a
collection of independent one-dimensional uniform distributions, and from a
Dirichlet distribution (which may be decomposed using Beta distributions).
For further details, we refer the reader to Song and Gupta (1997, Theorem
2.1, part (2) and (3)).
5

The marginal distribution of the j-th component Uj may be determined
using the Jacobi integral formula. The corresponding calculation leads to the
following result.
Lemma 2 (Song and Gupta, 1997). The univariate marginal density of g
with respect to any of the components u1 ; : : : ; un is given as
mj (uj ) =

p ( np )
2

( p1 )

( np 1 )

In particular, if p = n

(1

juj jp )

n 1
p

1

( j = 1; : : : ; n; 1 < uj < 1). (7)

1, then the univariate marginal is uniform.

Proof. See Song and Gupta (1997, Theorem 2.1, part (1)) for k = 1.
For example, in the special case where n = 3 and p = 2, the marginal density
of the j’s component Uj is given as
mj (uj ) =

2 ( 23 )
1
= ,
1
2
2 ( 2 ) (1)

(8)

hence constant, so that the marginal distribution is uniform on [ 1; 1]. This
special case of Lemma 2 has been used by Kovenock and Roberson (2011).
Below, we will exploit Lemma 2 more generally.

3. Set-up
There are N

2 risk-neutral agents, denoted by i 2 f1; : : : ; N g, and (N + 1)

battle…elds, denoted by j 2 f1; : : : ; N + 1g.8 Each agent is endowed with an
8

Thus, the number of battle…elds exceeds the number of agents by precisely one. This
speci…c assumption will be relaxed in Section 6.

6

identical budget of a perfectly divisible resource. For convenience, we normalize budgets to one. An agent’s resource allocation is a vector
+1
b = (b1 ; : : : ; bN +1 ) 2 RN
,
+

(9)

where bj 2 R+ = [0; 1) denotes the amount of the resource allocated to
battle…eld j. We call a resource allocation b = (b1 ; : : : ; bN +1 ) feasible if
N
+1
X

bj

1.

(10)

j=1

Denote by B N +1 the set of feasible resource allocations over N + 1 battle…elds.
The N agents simultaneously and independently choose feasible resource allocations. In each battle…eld, the agent that allocates the largest amount of
the resource wins. In the case of a tie, each of the agents that allocated the
largest amount of the resource to a battle…eld wins in that battle…eld with
equal probability. Each agent’s payo¤ equals the sum of the valuations of the
battle…elds won.
Agents are ex-ante identical but privately learn, before deciding about
the resource allocation, their respective vector of battle…eld valuations, v =
(v1 ; v2 ; : : : ; vN +1 ). The vector v is commonly known to be drawn, independently across agents, from a given (N + 1)-variate probability distribution.
Since, as discussed in the Introduction, a general solution of Colonel Blotto
games with incomplete information about valuations is presently out of reach,
we will work under parametric assumptions. The type space for an agent is
+1
given as the intersection of the nonnegative orthant RN
with a generalized
+

sphere Spn 1 , where the parameters are given by n = N + 1 and p = N (cf.
7

Section 2). Thus,
+1
V N = RN
\ Spn
+

1

(11)

N
+1
: v1N + : : : + vN
= f(v1 ; v2 ; : : : ; vN +1 ) 2 RN
+1 = 1g.
+

(12)

For example, in the special case N = 2, the type space V 2 corresponds to
the intersection of R3+ with the two-dimensional Euclidean unit sphere. For
general N

2, the dimension of the bordered type manifold V N is N , and

the dimension of the embedding space is N + 1. It will be assumed that each
agent’s valuation vector v is drawn from the Lp -norm uniform distribution on
+1
. The corresponding probability measure on
Spn 1 , conditional on v 2 RN
+

the Borel subsets of V N will be denoted by

N

.

4. Equilibrium analysis
A pure strategy is a measurable mapping b : V N ! B N +1 . Suppose that an
agent’s type is
v = (v1 ; v2 ; : : : ; vN +1 ) 2 V N .

(13)

When adhering to strategy b, type v’s resource allocation is
+1
b(v) = (b1 (v); : : : ; bN +1 (v)) 2 RN
.
+

(14)

Clearly, any strategy of an opponent induces a probability measure over feasible resource allocations. Therefore, given strategies for the (N

1) opponents,

type v’s resource allocation translates into a vector of winning probabilities,
and hence, into an expected payo¤ for type v. A strategy b is called a
8

symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy in the Colonel Blotto game with
incomplete information if, for any type realization v 2 V N , the resource allocation b (v) maximizes the expected payo¤ of type v under the assumption
that the other (N

1) agents individually adhere to strategy b . We will say

that an equilibrium strategy b is strict if each type v 2 V N even has a strict
incentive to choose the resource allocation b (v).
Proposition 1. Suppose that each agent’s (N + 1)-vector of battle…eld valuations is independently drawn according to the probability measure

N

on V N .

Then, the pure strategy b de…ned through
b (v) = ((v1 )N ; : : : ; (vN +1 )N )

(15)

is a strict symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy in the Colonel Blotto
game with incomplete information.
The strictness property contrasts with the case of Colonel Blotto games with
complete information where Nash equilibria are typically non-strict.
Proposition 1 extends known equilibrium characterizations for Colonel Blotto
games with incomplete information about valuations. The analysis of Kovenock
and Roberson (2011) is contained as a special case where N = 2. Akyol (2014)
allowed for any …nite number of battle…elds, but restricted attention to the
case of two agents. In addition, to account for his assumption that the distributions of valuation vectors are absolutely continuous, his characterization of
the equilibrium strategy entails a normalization factor, which would be one in
Proposition 1.
9

In comparison with the analysis of Adamo and Matros (2009), who considered incomplete information about budgets, we …nd that their Corollaries
1 and 2 hold likewise in the present setting, i.e., all agents compete for all
prizes, and each agent spends more on prizes she values higher. However,
their Corollaries 3 and 4 do not transfer to the present setting. Indeed, there
is no highest type in our setting and, as will be shown in the next section, the
expected payo¤ is constant across types in our model.
Proof of Proposition 1. For each battle…eld j 2 f1; : : : ; N + 1g, we denote
by Fj (:) the cumulative distribution function describing the marginal distribution of the component vj . Thus, Fj (z) =
v 2 V N : vj

N

VjN (z) , where VjN (z) =

z denotes the set of valuation vectors whose j-th component

does not exceed a given z 2 [0; 1]. Suppose that all agents i 2 f2; : : : ; N g
adhere to strategy b . Then, any agent i 2 f2; : : : ; N g of type
(i)

(i)

v (i) = (v1 ; : : : ; vN +1 ) 2 V N

(16)

(i)

allocates an amount bj (vj ) of the resource to battle…eld j 2 f1; : : : ; N + 1g.
Suppose further that agent 1 is of type
(1)

(1)

v (1) = (v1 ; : : : ; vN +1 ) 2 V N .
Then, since there are no mass points, agent 1’s optimization problem may be
written as
max

(1)
(1)
(b1 ;:::;bN +1 )2BN +1

N
+1
X

(1)

Pr bj

j=1

10

max

i2f2;:::;N g

(i)

bj (vj )

(1)

vj .

(17)

(1)

(1)

Now, for any resource allocation (b1 ; : : : ; bN +1 ) 2 B N +1 , and for any battle…eld j 2 f1; : : : ; N + 1g, the independence of type distributions across agents
yields
(1)

Pr bj

(i)

max

bj (vj )

i2f2;:::;N g

=

YN

i=2

n
(1)
Pr bj

o
(i)
bj (vj ) .

(18)

Moreover, for any i 2 f2; : : : ; N g,
n
(1)
Pr bj

o
(i)
(1)
bj (vj ) = Pr bj

(1)

= Pr

bj

= Fj

bj

(1)

N

(i)

(19)

vj
1=N

(i)

(20)

vj
1=N

.

(21)

Applying Lemma 2 with n = N + 1 and p = N , we see that
Fj (z) = 2

Z

z

mj (uj )duj
p ( np ) Z z

(22)

0

=

( p1 )

( np 1 )

N ( N1 + 1)
=
( N1 ) (1)
= z,

Z

(1

0

juj jp )

n 1
p

1

(23)

duj

z

(24)

duj

0

(25)

for any z 2 [0; 1]. Hence, Fj (:) is uniform. Putting the pieces together, we …nd
that
(1)

Pr bj
Let

max

i2f2;:::;N g

(i)

bj (vj )

=

YN

i=2

(1)

bj

1=N

(1)

= bj

(N 1)=N

.

(26)

(v (1) ) denote the shadow cost of the budget constraint in agent

1’s problem. Using the calculation above, agent 1’s problem in battle…eld
11

j 2 f1; : : : ; N + 1g may be written as
(1)

max

(N 1)=N

bj

(1)
bj 2[0;1]

(1)

(1)

bj .

vj

(27)

Note that agent 1’s objective function in (17) is strictly concave since N

2.

Solving the …rst-order condition,
N

1

(1)

(1=N )

bj

N

(1)

vj

= 0,

(28)

delivers
(1)
bj

N

N 1
N

=

(1)

vj

N

.

(29)

Clearly, in an optimal allocation, no resources remain unused, i.e.,
(1)

(1)

(30)

b1 + : : : + bN +1 = 1.
Moreover, since v (1) is drawn from V N , we have
(1)

v1

N

N

(1)

+ : : : + vN +1

= 1.

(31)

Therefore, summing Eq. (29) over all battle…elds j 2 f1; : : : ; N + 1g, we …nd
that

= (N

1)=N and, hence,
(1)

(1)

bj = vj

N

.

(32)

Thus, it is indeed optimal for type v (1) of agent 1 to allocate the resource as
prescribed by the symmetric equilibrium strategy b . Obviously, the same is
true for agents i 2 f2; : : : ; N g. This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.

12

5. Information rents
The symmetric equilibrium strategy identi…ed above has the property that
the amount of the resource deployed in any given battle…eld increases strictly
in the agent’s valuation of that battle…eld. Thus, the identi…ed Bayes-Nash
equilibrium leads to an e¢ cient selection of battle…eld winners, just as in the
symmetric single-unit all-pay auction with independent types.9
It is noteworthy, however, that the expected payo¤ of an agent does not
depend on the type realization. Indeed, using our intermediary result (26),
the expected payo¤ of type v (1) 2 V N of agent 1, say, is given by
R=
=
=
=

XN +1
j=1

XN +1
j=1

XN +1
j=1

XN +1
j=1

(1)

Pr bj (vj )
(1)

max

i2f2;:::;N g

(N 1)=N

bj (vj )
(1)

N 1

vj

(1)

(i)

bj (vj )

(1)

vj
(1)

vj

(1)

vj

(33)
(34)
(35)

N

(36)

vj

(37)

= 1.

We have shown the following.
Proposition 2. In the considered class of Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information, all types realize the same expected payo¤.
Thus, in contrast to the single-unit auction, where higher types realize positive
information rents as a consequence of incentive compatibility, any such bene…ts
net out over battle…elds in the considered class of Colonel Blotto games.10
9

This conclusion is not robust, however, with respect to a rescaling of the valuation
vector for a single player.
10
Clearly, this is so because the set of possible realizations of valuation vectors forms an

13

6. Networks of Blotto games
As an extension, we consider networks of Colonel Blotto games with N K
agents and (N + 1) K battle…elds, where K

1 is an integer. Each agent

is restricted to be active in (N + 1) given battle…elds, and draws a type from
V N . For example, any triangulation of a globe, say, may be understood as a
network of Blotto games, where each triangle represents an agent, and each
edge shared with a neighboring triangle represents a battle…eld. In this case,
N = 2 and K

2. Figure 2(a) illustrates this for K = 5. Another example is

a cube where each side represents an agent, and each adjacent node represents
a battle…eld. In this case, N = 3 and K = 2. See Figure 2(b) for illustration.
It is immediate to see that examples exist for any combination of N
K

2 and

2. The equilibrium analysis extends in a straightforward way. Intuitively,

an agent does not care whether she is facing, in any two distinct battle…elds,
the same opponent or two di¤erent opponents. This is so because the marginal
distribution of resource bids in each battle…eld does not depend on this.

Figure 2. Networks of Blotto games
antichain with respect to the product order on RN +1 .
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7. Concluding remark
The methods of this paper may be used to construct also new classes of mixedstrategy equilibria in two-player Colonel Blotto games with complete information and 2(N + 1) homogeneous battle…elds. These may be understood as
further generalizations of the disc solution (Borel and Ville, 1938; Gross and
Wagner, 1950; Laslier and Picard, 2002; Thomas, 2018). However, since the
number of battle…elds is even, such new solutions in the case of complete information would ultimately be of limited interest, for the same reasons discussed
by Laslier and Picard (2002), viz. that agents partition battle…elds into pairs,
and perfectly negatively correlate within each pair of battle…elds.11
By combining the insights of Akyol (2014) and the result of the present
paper, it seems feasible to construct additional examples involving any …nite
number of agents and any …nite number of battle…elds. We leave that extension
for future work.
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